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1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of labor market institutions (LMI) on the divide of
schooling investment between general and specific skills. We oﬀer a simple matching model
of unemployment that highlights the trade-oﬀ between general and specific skills at the
time of educational investment. Individuals have to allocate a fixed amount of educational
investment between general and vocational education. General education increases the
scope of skills, while vocational education raises the intensity of these skills. In partial
equilibrium, we show that the severity of market frictions distorts the schooling allocation
towards general skills. Then, we endogenize job creation and argue that changes in LMI
may well originate a non-monotonous relationship between unemployment and the divide
of skills between specific and general human capital. We also investigate more carefully
the impacts of unemployment compensation, minimum wage and firing costs. We suggest
that unemployment compensation has an ambiguous impact on the skill divide, while
minimum wage and firing costs are detrimental to general skill acquisition.
Our paper has two main motivations.
First, there is a substantial theoretical literature on the relationships between match-
ing frictions and the magnitude of educational investment (see among others Acemoglu,
1996, Moen, 1999, Burdett and Smith, 2002, Charlot and Decreuse, 2005). By contrast,
the literature on unemployment and the sharing of educational investment between dif-
ferent types of skills is very scarce. This discrepancy between the two literatures is not
necessarily fair in light of the aggregate evidence. The OECD provides with aggregate
data that sort individuals by educational level (from pre-primary schooling to research
program) and type of education (from general to vocational). These data feature sub-
stantial heterogeneity in both components of education. In the Appendix, we argue that
the magnitude of between-country heterogeneity in type of education persists over time,
while heterogeneity in level tends to decline over time. Put otherwise, the way individu-
als allocate their schooling investment between general and specific skills is probably as
economically meaningful as the amount of investment itself.
Second, LMI and the divide of schooling investment have been put forward recently to
explain the relatively low performance of a number of European labor markets since the
end of the 1970s. On the one hand, the minimum wage, the generosity of unemployment
insurance and the strictness of employment protection legislation would favor the persis-
tence of high unemployment rates while significantly slowing down the job reallocation
process necessary to sustain high productivity growth (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998,
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Nickell et al, 2005). On the other hand, vocationnally-
oriented European schooling systems would alter workers’ between-sector mobility (see
Krueger and Kumar, 2004). What about their interactions? Do stricter LMI distort edu-
cational investment towards specific skills? From an empirical point of view, we show in
the Appendix that aggregate data do not allow to identify a clear Anglo-Saxon and a clear
continental European model. Of course, the proportion of graduates with a vocationnaly-
oriented secondary education is very high in Germany, while it very low in the US. But
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these statements do not generalize to other countries. In addition, what is true at the sec-
ondary level of education is not necessarily true at the tertiary level. Hence, there are no
simple relationships between LMI and the allocation of educational investment between
general and specific skills. Our paper oﬀers a rationale for such ambiguous outcome that
is based on the interaction between partial and general equilibrium eﬀects.
From a theoretical point of view, in a contribution devoted to on-the-job training,
Wasmer (2006) argues that matching frictions should favour the acquisition of specific
skills rather than general skills. Wasmer uses an elegant metaphor to explain his result:
“in an economy made up of far-spread islands, it is better to learn the technology of
the island on which one lives.” Our paper questions the generality of Wasmer’s result
when one considers human capital investments before the labor market entry, rather than
once in the job. Our main conclusion is that the severity of frictions directs investments
towards general rather than specific skills. Compared to Wasmer’s, our framework can be
interpreted as follows: students are sailing the ocean, waiting for an island to inhabit. As
the density of islands goes down, the knowledge of one peculiar technology becomes less
and less useful. This messages is closer to Rosen (1983), who studies the allocation of skill
investment in a framework where individuals also allocate their time endowment between
the diﬀerent skills. Rosen argues that the incentives to specialization are very related to
skill use: “the return to investment in a particular skill is increasing in its subsequent
rate of utilisation”. Following this argument, LMI should bias educational investment
towards general schooling: LMI increase market frictions, which in turn lowers the rate of
utilisation of any particular skill. Actually, this intuition governs the general equilibrium
eﬀects in our model.
Importantly, the abrupt distinction between general and specific human capital cannot
be directly used in the study of general versus vocational education. At the time of
educational choices, workers are not informed of the identity of the firms they will meet.
Hence, human capital accumulated through vocational schooling cannot be purely specific
in the traditional sense: workers would have no chance to use such a kind of human
capital, and, consequently, the whole investment would be spent in general human capital.
Our paper proposes a theoretical framework allowing to capture these two dimensions
of education. We build on Charlot et al (2005), who consider a matching model with
multi-dimensional skills and ex-post wage bargaining. The idea is that general education
provides basic cognitive skills in diﬀerent fields of knowledge and vocational education
transforms such abilities into productive skills. General education determines the scope
of one’s skills, that is the fraction of jobs on which the worker can operate. Vocational
education determines the intensity of one’s skills, that is worker’s productivity on these
jobs. This view of human capital is not only useful to understand schooling investments,
but it is also in line with Becker who himself noted that human capital is neither purely
general nor specific.
In Charlot et al, the divide of investment between vocational and general education is
fixed. We complete that paper by endogenizing the mix of general and specific skills. We
thus assume that the total investment in education is given. Students have to allocate
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this investment between vocational and general education. As in Wasmer, therefore,
the scope of one’s skills and the intensity of these skills evolve in opposite directions:
an individual devoting a larger part of her resources to vocational education will be
more productive once in the job, but her skills will be worthwhile in fewer jobs. In the
competitive environment — the limit case where frictions disappear —, general education
is useless because it is very easy to contact any type of job. Therefore, individuals devote
the main part of their investment to vocational schooling. Conversely, very specific skills
become much less attractive when contacting a proper job takes a lot of time/resources.
Thus, matching frictions originate incentives to acquire general skills1.
We proceed in three steps.
First, we build a simple model of educational choice in which individuals have to
set the mix of general and specific skills. Skills are acquired before the labor market
entry. Then, workers receive job oﬀers at a constant and exogenous rate. The job oﬀer
rate characterizes the intensity of matching frictions. We show that the proportion of
educational investment that is directed towards general skills is decreasing in the job
oﬀer rate. Indeed, the purpose of general skills is to increase the share of match surplus
accruing to the worker. However, match surplus goes down when the contact rate goes
up. The result follows.
To further explain our result, we consider Wasmer’s case of on-the-job investment. To
simplify, we consider a once-in-life human capital investment achieved while occupying
a job. We show that such worker chooses a basket of skills that contains fewer general
skills and more specific skills than students do. We also show that the job oﬀer rate has
two eﬀects on the composition of skills. The first eﬀect is common to educational and
on-the-job investments. Match surplus goes down, which is detrimental to the acquisition
of general skills. The second eﬀect is specific to employed workers. The share of outside
opportunities in overall utility goes up with the job oﬀer rate. This implies that employed
workers pay more attention to their outside opportunities, which requires to invest more
in general skills. The interplay between these two eﬀects leads to a ∩-shaped relationship
between the job oﬀer rate and the proportion of investment in general skills.
Second, we turn to macroeconomic implications of our model. The partial equilibrium
relationship highlighted below suggests that unemployment and the proportion of educa-
tional investment spent in general skills should be positively correlated. It is not what the
data seem to say. Hence, we turn to general equilibrium considerations. Unemployment
and the divide of skills are two equilibrium outcomes. Their movements reflect changes
in a third variable. From that perspective, Europe and the US mainly diﬀer with respect
to their labor market institutions (LMI). Which type of relationship between unemploy-
ment and the divide of skills should we expect given that changes are actually driven by
alterations in LMI? We enrich our model to answer such a question: there is a matching
1In a diﬀerent setting, Gould, Moav andWeinberg (2001) argue that unemployment creates educational
incentives, because it originates a demand for precautionary education from risk averse individuals. Unlike
Gould et al, individuals are risk neutral in our paper, and education can oﬀer both general and specific
skills.
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technology on the labor market, and the number of vacancies responds to a zero-profit
condition. In that environment, the size of LMI is broadly captured by workers’ bar-
gaining power. The equilibrium ratio of vacancy to unemployed strictly decreases with
workers’ bargaining power. The amount of general skills is first decreasing, then increas-
ing in such bargaining power, reaching a minimum when the Hosios condition is met. It
follows that changes in workers’ bargaining power induce a non-monotonous relationship
between unemployment rate and the amount of general skills.
Third, we revisit the partial and general equilibrium eﬀects of several labor market
institutions. In this purpose, we consider three extensions of our model. Each extension is
devoted to a particular institution: (i) unemployment compensation, (ii) minimum wage,
and (iii) firing costs.
(i) In line with our general discussion below, we argue that unemployment compen-
sation has a non-monotonous impact on the proportion of educational investment spent
in general skills. We particularly discuss the fact that young entrants are generally ex-
cluded from unemployment insurance eligibility. This generates an entitlement eﬀect very
close to Mortensen (1977) according to which the generosity of unemployment insurance
motivates general skill acquisition.
(ii) The case of the minimum wage is more intriguing as the minimum wage distorts
investments towards specific skills. It has already been shown that the minimum wage
provides with incentives to skill acquisition, as potential employees must increase their
skills to meet employers’ standards (see Agell and Lommerud, 1997, and Acemoglu and
Pischke, 2005). We complete that view by suggesting that this eﬀect may lower the
eﬃciency of the matching process by reducing the general skills of the workforce. From
that perspective the minimum wage belongs to the factors that may explain moves in the
Beveridge curve.
(iii) We argue that firing costs tend to distort educational investments towards specific
skills. The key mechanism relies on the fact that administrative costs lower the matching
surplus that the firm-worker pair has to share at the time of match formation. The
marginal returns to general skill acquisition falls as a result. This prediction strengthens
Wasmer’s point, who claims that the strictness of employment protection distorts on-the-
job investments towards specific skills. It is also interesting because it shows that the key
relationship of our model between matching frictions and the direction of the bias in skill
acquisition is compatible with the fact institutions that are usually associated with labor
market sclerosis are detrimental to general skill acquisition.
This paper is related to diﬀerent strands of literature. The paper which seems appar-
ently the closest is Mukoyama and Sahin (2006). They are interested in the impact of
unemployment compensation on the incentives to specialization. As Rosen (1983), they
assume there are two tasks and each workers has the choice of investing in both corre-
sponding skills or just one of them. A worker needs to form a match with another worker
to produce and the payoﬀ is maximized if at least one worker can perform on each task.
Therefore, search frictions create uncertainty and investment in general skills helps one to
cope with such uncertainty. There are three key diﬀerences with our paper. First, there is
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no trade-oﬀ between general and specific skills. A worker who invests more can perform
more tasks with unchanged productivity. From that perspective Mukoyama and Sahin
(2006) are more interested in the level of educational investment than in the composition
of such investment. Second, there are no general equilibrium eﬀects: contact rates are ex-
ogenously given in their analysis. Finally, they highlight another decision margin, namely
the fact that a worker may refuse a match in order to find a better match in the future.
This paper is also related to the literature that emphasizes the role of industry-specific
skills in labor markets where workers are imperfectly mobile between sectors. Stevens
(1994) introduces the notion of transferable skills. These skills are neither specific nor
general. They can only be used in a proportion of the diﬀerent available jobs. Stevens
argues that there is an underprovision of transferable skills by employers. Smits (2007)
goes a step further and distinguishes industry-specific skills from generic skills (that have
a higher value elsewhere in the economy). He examine the following conflict of interest at
the time of training investment: workers want more generic skills than is socially optimal,
while firms do not want that the worker learns generic skills at all. Our paper complements
this literature in two ways. First, it focuses on educational investments rather than on-
the-job training. Second, it examines the role played by job availability, and shows that
job availability tends to distort the trade-oﬀ between general and specific skills towards
more specific skills.
There is a growing literature that analyses the role of LMI on the incentives for firms
to fund general training investment. Unions may encourage training because they reduce
labor turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 1998). Wage compression induced by a minimum
wage increase may have a positive eﬀect on the incentives to train the less skilled workers
to improve their productivity (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, 2003). Finally, Fella (2004)
predicts a positive correlation between investment in general training and the strictness
of employment protection rules. The present paper complements this literature mainly
by analyzing the role of labor market institutions on the schooling allocation between
general and specific skills.
The trade-oﬀ we analyse between vocational and general education borrows from the
notions of marketability and specialization highlighted in the literature on money and
search (see e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993, and Shi, 1997). The main idea in these papers
is that each producer faces a trade-oﬀ between specialization and marketability. Special-
izing in the production of a given commodity allows better productivity (or, equivalently,
saves on production costs), but at the expense of reducing the proportion of consumers
interested in purchasing the good, i.e. marketability is smaller. Typically, money plays
a crucial role in this approach as it enlarges the size of the market and therefore allows
producers to specialize. From that perspective, the reader should not be very surprised by
our results. We simply argue that market size increases the probability of trade, which in
turn allows the workers to get more specialized where they have comparative advantages
at the time of educational investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework, and
discusses the divide of skills in partial equilibrium, that is at given rate of contacting a
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job oﬀer. Section 3 considers job creation decisions, and analyzes movements in unem-
ployment rate and general education induced by changes in workers’ bargaining power.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The divide of skills in partial equilibrium
In this section, we propose a model of educational investment that features (i) a trade-
oﬀ between general and specific skills and (ii) matching frictions on the labor market.
We first show that matching frictions distort the trade-oﬀ towards general skills. We
then argue that this phenomenon is very related to education: Using the same model
of multi-dimensional skills, we show that market frictions are likely to distort on-the-job
investments towards specific skills rather than general skills.
2.1 Educational investments
We are interested in the schooling investment of an infinite lifetime individual living in
a stationary environment. She is risk neutral, and discounts time at rate r. Her total
human capital investment I is given. It can be viewed either as the exogenous schooling
duration, or total spending in education. The individual must divide this investment
between specific and general skills, i.e. vocational and general education. Let g denote
the amount of general skills, while s = I − g denote the amount of specific skills.
The notions of specific and general skills rely to the technological side of the economy.
There are a continuum of sectors, each producing a final good entering preferences sym-
metrically. Sectors are of mass one. Each sector is associated to a particular technology.
While dividing human capital, the worker chooses the scope and the intensity of her skills.
General skills thus increase the share of technologies the worker can operate, while specific
skills raise the productivity in each known technology. Formally, the proportion of tech-
nologies the worker knows is H (g), with H (0) = 0, H (I) ≤ 1, H 0 (g) > 0, H 00 (g) < 0.
The intensity of her skills is f (s), with f (0) = 0, f 0 (s) > 0, f 00 (s) < 0.
The labor market is frictional. Matching frictions have two important consequences.
First, there is only a probability of contacting a job per period. Let µ denote the flow
probability that a worker receives a job oﬀer from a particular sector. Thus µ−1 measures
the severity of frictions. Given that H (g) is the proportion of jobs the worker can occupy,
µH (g) is the rate of acceptable job oﬀer. It is increasing in g, and decreasing in the severity
of frictions. Second, each match is associated to a match surplus that the employer and
the worker must share. We follow the literature and assume that there is wage bargaining
over the match surplus.
Let U = U (s, g) denote the utility of an unemployed, and W =W (s, g) the utility of
an employed worker. We have:
rU = µH (g) [W − U ] (1)
rW = w + q [U −W ] (2)
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where q is the (exogenous) rate of job destruction and w is the wage. Symmetrically,
J = J (s, g) is the value of a filled job. We have:
rJ = f (I − g)− w + q [V − J ] (3)
where V the value of a vacancy is given. The wage splits the match surplus S = W −
U + J − V according to
W − U = βS = β
1− β (J − V ) (4)
It follows that the match surplus is:
S (s, g) =
f (s)− rV
r + q + βµH (g)
(5)
At the time of investment, the individual does not know which firm will hire her. As a
consequence, she maximizes the value of her future search. From the diﬀerent equations,
we have
rU (s, g) = βµH (g)S (s, g) (6)
The optimal allocation of educational investment between general and specific skills must
maximize the contact surplus H (g)S (s, g). The divide of skills results from
H 0 (g)
H (g)
+
∂S (I − g, g) /∂g
S (I − g, g) =
∂S (I − g, g) /∂s
S (I − g, g) (7)
where
∂S (s, g) /∂g
S (s, g)
= −H
0 (g)
H (g)
βµH (g)
r + q + βµH (g)
(8)
∂S (s, g) /∂s
S (s, g)
=
f 0 (s)
f (s)− rV (9)
The optimal divide of schooling investment balances the marginal returns to general and
specific skills. General skills increase the contact surplus by raising the probability that
such contact gives birth to an employment relationship. However, general skills reduce
the match surplus because they improve the chance of contacting an adequate employer,
thereby making the economic position of the unemployed closer to that of an employed
worker. The size of the latter eﬀect increases with the product βµ, that is with the
chance of contacting a vacancy times the share of contact surplus obtained in such an
event. Specific skills do not alter the probability to match, yet they raise match output,
thereby increasing match surplus.
It follows that:
H 0 (g)
H (g)
f (I − g)− rV
r + q + βµH (g)
=
f 0 (I − g)
r + q
(10)
The divide between general and specific skills responds to alterations in their respective
marginal returns. Our main result follows: the severity of frictions µ−1 originates incen-
tives to acquire general skills rather than specific skills. Intuitively, the purpose of general
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skills is to improve the ability to receive job oﬀers, thereby raising the share of the match
surplus accruing to the worker. The share of investment accruing to such skills thus goes
up with the match surplus. Hence, the severity of frictions motivates the acquisition of
general skills because frictions increase the size of the match surplus. For instance, general
skills are useless when it is very easy to get matched with a proper vacancy. Consider
the walrasian environment. There, µ tends to infinity, which implies that unemployment
spells are arbitrarily short, and contacting any type of alternative employer is immediate.
The match surplus is nil, and there is no need to speed up the job search. The whole
investment is then devoted to the acquisition of specific skills, i.e. g = 0. Conversely, mar-
ket frictions reduce the interest of very specific skills, which become much more diﬃcult
to trade.
One may be interested in the impact of bargaining power on the divide of skills. Gen-
eral skills decrease with bargaining power β. Indeed, worker’s bargaining power reduces
current match surplus as it allows the job-seeker to capture a larger part of alternative
match surpluses. Together with the negative impact of µ on general skills, this negative
impact of β suggests that the divide of skills may respond non-monotonously to changes
in β once the negative impact of β on job creation has been accounted for. This is the
subject of the next section.
2.2 On-the-job investments
Our main result diﬀers from Wasmer (2006), who argues that matching frictions deterio-
rate the incentives to acquire general skills. There are two important diﬀerences with his
paper.
First, there are two diﬀerent views of human capital involved. Wasmer considers
Becker’s case of specific human capital where specific skills can only be used in one firm2.
The severity of frictions, therefore, does not alter the incentives to invest in specific skills
as there is no market for such skills regardless alternative employers are easy to contact or
not. Conversely, specific skills are not limited to a single firm in our view. For instance,
they can be used at the sector level, or at the industry level. In such a case, the return
to specific skills increases with worker’s ability to contact an alternative employer.
The second diﬀerence with Wasmer originates from the timing of investment: Wasmer
analyses on-the-job investments, while we are interested in educational investments. To
discuss the role played by this second diﬀerence, we assume in the remaining of this section
that individuals choose the divide of skills once in the job rather than before the labour
market entry. For simplicity, we assume that this is a one-shot investment, that will not
be done again in the future.
Assume that the individual chooses the divide of skills once in the job rather than
2This assumption is the only assumption allowing to reach a non-walrasian result (i.e. a positive
match surplus) in the walrasian model. If specific human capital could be used in at least two firms, they
could enter Bertrand competition to attach worker’s services, and the worker would be paid her marginal
product.
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before the labor market entry. The value of a job is
rW (s, g) = β [r + µH (g)]S (s, g) = βrS (s, g) + rU (s, g) (11)
The combination of matching frictions µ <∞ and positive discount rates r > 0 originates
rents associated to the fact of having a job. That is why W > U . Importantly, the size
of rents increases with workers’ bargaining power β and discount rate r. General skills
result from:
H 0 (g)
H (g)
µH (g)
r + µH (g)
+
∂S (I − g, g) /∂g
S (I − g, g) =
∂S (I − g, g) /∂s
S (I − g, g) (12)
The marginal return to general skills is typically lower than before: employees have small
incentives to capture the match surplus derived from another employment relationship.
Thus, employed workers invest more in specific skills than the students at given magnitude
of investment3. The divide of skills results from:
H 0 (g)
H (g)
µH (g)
r + µH (g)
S (s, g) =
f 0 (I − g)
(1− β) r + q (13)
The term µH (g) / (r + µH (g)) = U/W is the ratio of unemployed utility to employed
utility. It measures the size of rents extracted by the workers, as well as the size of outside
opportunities in workers’ wealth. The purpose of general skills is to increase such outside
opportunities. They are all the more useful than outside opportunities matter for the
employed workers. Now, changes in the contact rate µ have two eﬀects. The first eﬀect is
common to employed and unemployed workers. An increase in µ reduces match surplus,
which lowers the incentives to acquire general skills. The second eﬀect is specific to the
employed workers. An increase in µ raises the ratio of outside opportunities to workers’
utility. Employed workers, therefore, pay more attention to their outside opportunities,
which requires to invest more in general skills. Formally,
dg
dµ
sign
= r (r + q)− β [µH (g)]2 (14)
The relative size of the two eﬀects depends on the discount rate, which governs the size
of rents obtained by employed workers. Thus, investment in general skills increases with
the contact rate (like Wasmer) when the discount rate is large, while it decreases with the
contact rate when the discount rate is small (unlike Wasmer). Note, however, that the
negative eﬀect dominates the positive eﬀect for realistic values of the parameters. This
means that the severity of market frictions directs on-the-job investments towards specific
rather general skills.
3This provides a rationale to papers assuming that educational investments are purely general. Actu-
ally, they are more general than on-the-job investments.
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3 Equilibrium unemployment and the composition of
human capital
In this section, we suggest that there are no reasons to expect a monotonous relationship
between the divide of skills and the extent of unemployment. Both are equilibrium out-
comes which are influenced by structural parameters like labor market institutions (LMI).
In our model, the size of LMI is measured by workers’ bargaining power β. We incor-
porate the framework of the previous section into an equilibrium matching model of the
labor market, and show that changes in β drive a non-monotonous relationship between
the unemployment rate and the share of schooling investment spent in general skills.
To close the model, we need an explicit matching market with a matching technology
for heterogenous jobs and heterogenous skills. We assume that there is a unique search
market for all workers and vacant jobs, i.e. search is undirected4. Let θ be the labor
market tightness, that is the ratio of vacancies to unemployed. The rate of contacting a
vacancy is thus µ = µ (θ), while the rate of contacting a worker is µ (θ) /θ. The function
µ is such that µ0 (θ) > 0, µ00 (θ) < 0, and µ (0) = µ (∞)−1 = 0.
We also need agents who must take schooling decisions at each instant. We thus
assume that new cohorts enter the economy at rate n > 0.
Equilibrium tightness is derived from a zero-profit condition. Assume that workers
have all the same amount of general and specific skills. Let V denote the value of a
vacancy, and c be the flow cost of posting a vacancy. One has
rV = −c+ µ (θ)
θ
H (g) [J (s, g)− V ] (15)
In equilibrium, V = 0 and
c
θ
µ (θ)
= (1− β)H (g)S (θ, s, g, β) (16)
This equation defines tightness as an increasing function of contact surplusH (g)S (θ, s, g, β),
where the dependence of match surplus vis-à-vis θ and β has been highlighted. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, general skills improve the probability to match with an
adequate worker, but deteriorate match surplus. Specific skills raise output, thereby in-
creasing match surplus. It follows that tightness is increasing in s. Finally, tightness is
decreasing in workers’ bargaining power β, which lowers firms’ profitability.
Equilibrium tightness θ∗ and general skill investment g∗ jointly solve
H 0 (g)
H (g)
S (θ, I − g, g, β) = f
0 (I − g)
r + q
(SD)
(1− β)H (g)S (θ, I − g, g, β) = c θ
µ (θ)
(MT)
4Alternatively, the search market could be segmented by technology, and workers would participate
to all the submarkets they know the underlying technology. The results would be the same.
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Figure 1: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
The skill-divide equation (SD) defines the investment in general skills as an increasing
function of match surplus, while the labor market tightness equation (MT) defines tight-
ness as an increasing function of contact surplus. Equation (SD) thus defines an implicit
function g (θ, β) which is strictly decreasing in both arguments. Equation (MT) defines
an implicit function θ (g, β). It is strictly decreasing in β, while it is non-monotonous in
g, increasing at first, reaching a maximum and then decreasing.
Figure 1 depicts the two curves. The curve (SD) is strictly decreasing, while (MT)
describes a bell-shaped curve. The two curves intersect once at the maximum of (MT).
Indeed, investment in general skills maximizes match surplus for every tightness, while
tightness is increasing in the latter surplus. It follows that there is a unique equilibrium.
We now turn to the impact of the bargaining power β. We have5
dθ∗
dβ
=
∂θ (g∗, β)
∂β
< 0 (17)
dg∗
dβ
=
∂g (θ∗, β)
∂β
+
∂g (θ∗, β)
∂θ
dθ∗
dβ
(18)
Thus,
dg∗
dβ
sign
=
∂S (θ∗, I − g∗, g∗, β)
∂β
+
∂S (θ∗, I − g∗, g∗, β)
∂θ
dθ∗
dβ
5Note that ∂θ (g∗, β) /∂g = 0 - see Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Non-monotonicity of the relationship between equilibrium tightness and equi-
librium investment in general skills
The bargaining power aﬀects the skill divide through changes in match surplus. The
bargaining power has two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, it directly decreases match
surplus, which reduces the return to general skills. On the other hand, it reduces tightness,
thereby increasing match surplus and thus raising the return to general skills. Finally,
dg∗
dβ
sign
= β − (1− α (θ∗)) (19)
where α (θ) ≡ θµ0(θ)/µ (θ) is the elasticity of the contact rate with respect to tightness.
The proportion of investment spent in general skills follows a ∪-shaped curve as β goes
from 0 to 1. It reaches a minimum when the Hosios condition is met (Hosios, 1990), that
is when β = 1−α. This property follows from the fact that the amount of general skills is
increasing in match surplus, and such match surplus is minimized at the Hosios condition.
Thus, tightness is strictly decreasing in bargaining power, while general skills non-
monotonously respond to changes in β. If a statistician were to observe changes in tight-
ness and general skills, while such changes are driven by modifications in parameter β,
she would find a non-monotonous relationship between tightness and general skills. Such
a relationship is depicted by Figure 2.
Figure 2 has a major implication. Consider two economies with diﬀerent β and other-
wise seemingly identical. The economy with the largest β may well spend fewer resources
in general skills despite unemployment is higher. Put otherwise, the model can predict
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that (i) matching frictions creates incentives to acquire general rather than specific skills
and (ii) that the Germans invest less in general skills than the Americans even though
the contact rate is higher in the US than in Germany.
4 Labor market institutions and the composition of
educational investment
In this section, we examine more carefully the role played by diﬀerent labor market
institutions on the divide of educational investment between general and specific skills.
We begin with unemployment compensation, which is a clear substitute to bargaining
power in matching models. Then, we turn to the minimum wage. Finally, we focus on
firing costs.
4.1 Unemployment compensation
It has been argued that unemployment insurance allows the workers to invest in specific
skills (see e.g. Grossman and Shapiro, 1982, Estevez et al, 2001). In this sub-section, we
revisit this prediction in two steps. First, we show that unemployment benefits should
have a non-monotonous impact on the proportion of investment spent in general skills. At
the micro level, unemployment benefits favor the acquisition of specific skills. However,
there is a negative eﬀect at the macro level due to the negative impact of unemployment
benefits on job creation. Second, we account for the fact that most of the youth are non
eligible to unemployment insurance because they have never been employed. There we
show that unemployment compensation has an entitlement eﬀect that tends to favour
general skills.
We modify our model as follows. Let b0 denote unemployment income of a young
worker who never contributed to unemployment insurance. In our view, it mainly cor-
responds to the family contribution to the unfortunate child. Let also b denote formal
unemployment benefits. For simplicity, there are no time limit to unemployment benefits,
we do not account for taxes, and we assume that eligibility for unemployment insurance
is obtained with the first job. We must distinguish U0 the intertemporal utility of a new-
comer on the labor market from U the intertemporal utility of an unemployed who is
eligible to unemployment insurance. We have:
rU0 = b0 + µH (g) [W − U0] (20)
rU = b+ µH (g) [W − U ] (21)
The rest of the model is unchanged. Wages are perpetually bargained, so that match
surplus is worth:
S (s, g) =
f (s, g)− rV − b
r + q + βµH (g)
(22)
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As it is well known in matching models, unemployment benefits mimic the impacts of
bargaining power. As a result, they deteriorate match surplus as they reduce the utility
diﬀerential between having a job and being unemployed.
Students aim at maximizing
rU0 (s, g) = b0 + βµH (g)S (s, g) + µH (g) (U − U0) (23)
which can also be written
rU0 (s, g) = b0 + βµ (θ)H (g)S (s, g) +
µH (g)
r + µH (g)
(b− b0) (24)
The return to search is worth instantaneous income b0, plus contact rate times the pro-
portion β of contact surplus HS, plus a term that corresponds to the permanent gain
achieved once the first job is obtained. This gain increases with general skills, which
strengthens the incentives to invest in general skills.
Formally, the optimal trade-oﬀ between general and specific skills results from:
H 0 (g)
H (g)
S (I − g, g) + H
0 (g)
H (g)
b− b0
r + q
r [r + q + βµH (g)]
[r + µH (g)]2
=
f 0 (I − g)
r + q
(25)
The marginal return to general skills must account for the marginal increase in probability
to benefit from a permanent increase in unemployment income.
What are the eﬀects of parameters b and b0? We begin with b0. This parameter
reduces the marginal return to general skills, without aﬀecting the marginal return to
specific skills. Hence, b0 raises the incentives to invest in specific skills.
Now, consider b. The marginal impact on the investment in general skills results from
two eﬀects:
−1
r + q + βµH
diminishing surplus eﬀect (-)
+
1
r + q
r (r + q + βµH)
(r + µH)2
entitlement eﬀect (+)
(26)
On the one hand, unemployment benefits deteriorate match surplus, which raises the in-
centives to invest in specific skills as the general intuition suggests. On the other hand,
unemployment insurance generates an entitlement eﬀect that raises the incentives to in-
vest in general skills. Indeed, just like unemployment benefits tend to increase search ef-
fort/decrease search choosiness among non-entitled workers, unemployment benefits also
tend to favour general skills that speed-up job-finding.
Quantitatively, the latter expression has the sign of
− (1− β) rµH [2 (r + q) + (1 + β)µH] + q
£
(r + q) r − µ2H2
¤
(27)
The two eﬀects discussed below combine so that general skills may either increase or
decrease with unemployment benefits. More particularly, the eﬀect is negative when µ
is suﬃciently low. However, realistic values of the parameters and endogenous variables
suggest that the overall impact of unemployment benefits on general skills is negative.
The entitlement eﬀect is not suﬃciently strong to dominate the diminishing surplus eﬀect.
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From a more general perspective, this suggests that the entitlement eﬀect is maximized
in labor markets characterized by heavy frictions. Low unemployment benefits in such
a context strengthens the incentives to acquire specific skills, which further raises the
unemployment problem.
4.2 Minimum wage
Changes in the minimum wage may seem very close to changes in bargaining power.
Indeed, they are model-substitute at given educational investment. However, they are
deeply diﬀerent once the endogeneity of educational investments is taken into account.
This sub-section makes two contributions. First, it suggests that heterogenous workers
respond very diﬀerently to changes in the minimumwage. Constrained workers direct their
investment towards more specific skills, while more able workers spend a higher proportion
of their educational investment in general skills. Second, it argues that changes in the
minimum wage may explain moves in the Beveridge curve.
Hereafter, we focus on the low-skilled segment of the labor market. Hence, the level
of educational attainment I that we discuss is the secondary level following the ISCED
classification. Assume that there are two types of workers index by i = 1, 2. Type-i
workers lie in proportion πi ∈ (0, 1), π1 = 1 − π2. The productivity of each type of
workers is worth yi (s) = Aif (s), with A1 > A2, i.e. type-1 workers are more productive
than type-2 workers for every possible level of specific skills.
We now investigate how these two individuals share their investment between general
and specific skills. For this purpose, let wβ,i (s, g) denote the bargained wage of a type-i
worker whose basket of skills is (s, g). Let also bgi denote the optimal investment of such
worker in the absence of the minimum wage. This investment solves:
H 0 (g)
H (g)
Aif (I − g)
r + q + βµH (g)
=
Aif 0 (I − g)
r + q
(28)
This implies that bg1 = bg2. Now suppose that wβ,1 (bs1) > wmin > wβ,2 (bs2). Put otherwise,
the skill divide achieved by lower able workers does not provide them with suﬃcient
specific skills to get employable. Such workers will be compelled to invest more than
they would like in specific skills. Consequently, A2f (s∗2) = wmin. This has a number of
implications. First, s∗2 > s
∗
1, reflecting the fact that skill allocation is distorted towards
specific skills for the lower able. Second, higher able are more productive than lower
able workers: y1 > y2 (if not, higher able would also be compelled to invest more in
specific skills). Third, higher able benefit from a larger exit rate from unemployment:
µH (g∗1) > µH (g
∗
2).
Following a minimum wage increase, lower able workers increase the share of their
investment devoted to specific skills. This idea according to which the minimum wage
may create incentives to skill acquisition has already been put forward by diﬀerent studies
(Cahuc and Michel, 1996, Agell and Lommerud, 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke, 2005). The
key prediction of our paper relies on the opportunity cost of the increase in specific skills:
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workers have to reduce their investment in general skills, which lowers their employment
prospects6.
To derive general equilibrium implications, note that the free entry condition must be
modified as follows:
c
θ
µ (θ)
= eπ1 (1− β)H (g1)S1 (I − g1, g1) (29)
where eπ1 is the proportion of lower able workers among the unemployed. As g1 maximizes
the contact surplus H (g1)S1 (I − g1, g1), the only eﬀects of the minimum wage translates
through changes in eπ1. But,
eπ1 = π1 qq+µ(θ)H(g1)π1 qq+µ(θ)H(g1) + (1− π1) qq+µ(θ)H(g2)
=
π1
π1 + (1− π1) q+µ(θ)H(g1)q+µ(θ)H(g2)
which decreases when g2 goes down. Tightness decreases with the minimum wage as it
raises the proportion of lower able workers. In turn, the fall in tightness incites higher
able workers to change the skill allocation. However, unlike the lower able workers, higher
able increase the proportion of investment spent in general skills rather than in specific
skills.
We conclude this section by examining the eﬀects of the minimum wage on the Bev-
eridge curve:
u = π1
q
q + µ (θ)H (g1)
+ (1− π1)
q
q + µ (θ)H (g2)
(30)
The increase in the minimum wage alters the shape of the curve as it reduces g2. The
curve moves rightward in the (u, v) plane. A high minimum wage is somehow paid by
deterioration in the matching process due to falling investments in general skills.
To summarize, an increase in the minimum wage should decrease (within-group) wage
inequality, increase unemployment inequality, deteriorate the Beveridge curve.
4.3 Employment protection
Wasmer argues that employment protection distorts on-the-job skill investments towards
specific rather than general skills. In his model, this result arises because firing costs
increase search frictions, which are detrimental to general skill acquisition once in the
job. In this sub-section, we show that Wasmer’s main message also holds at the time of
education: firing costs incite individuals to allocate a larger proportion of their educational
investment in specific skill acquisition. However, the mechanisms involved are deeply
diﬀerent: specific skills become more attractive because matching surplus goes down with
employment protection, and this is so despite falling tightness.
6Becker (1964) also argues that the minimum wage tends to reduce skill acquisition. His argument
relies on the fact that the minimum wage prevents from wage cuts used by firms to finance on-the-job
training.
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The modelling aspects of employment protection and job destruction closely follows
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Wasmer (2006). The productivity of a job depends
on specific skills f (s) and on a firm-specific component ε as follows: y = f (s) + ε. The
firm component is random. It evolves according to a Poisson process with intensity λ
and is drawn from a density function g (ε) with c.d.f. G (ε). The density has support
[ε−, ε0] and ε0 is also the initial value of ε at the time of match formation. Before a new
shock arrives, separation takes place at no cost. After the shock, the firm must pay the
administrative firing cost T in case of separation. We assume that ε0 > λT .
In the remaining, we distinguish match surplus according to whether the job never
experimented any productivity shock — S0 (s, g) — or a productivity shock already occurred
— S (s, g, ε). We define value functions accordingly, i.e. worker’s and firm’s value functions
are denoted by W 0 (s, g), W (s, g, ε), J0 (s, g) and J (s, g, ε). Match surpluses are defined
as follows:
S0 (s, g) = W 0 (s, g)− U (s, g) + J0 (s, g)− V (31)
S (s, g, ε) = W (s, g, ε)− U (s, g) + J (s, g, ε)− V + T (32)
Match surplus is still split between the firm and the worker so that W 0 (s, g) = βS0 (s, g)
and W (s, g, ε) = βS (s, g, ε). This simple rule has two well-known implications. First, it
leads to eﬃcient job separation: job destruction occurs whenever match surplus becomes
negative. Let εd ≡ εd (s, g) denote the reservation productivity such that match surplus
is equal to zero, i.e. S
¡
s, g, εd
¢
= 0. Second, S0 (s, g) = S (s, g, ε0)− T .
After simple and usual computations, and setting V to zero, we get
S0 (s, g) =
ε0 − εd(s, g)− (r + λ)T
r + λ
(33)
εd (s, g) = βµH (g)S0 (s, g)− f (s)− rT − λ
r + λ
Z ε0
εd(s,g)
[1−G(eε)] deε (34)
This way of writing initial match surplus is particularly comfortable, because changes in
educational mix (s, g), tightness θ or bargaining power β only transit through changes in
εd. Importantly, initial match surplus decreases with firing costs T .
The optimal divide of schooling investment between general and specific skills results
from
max
g
©
rU (I − g, g) = βµH (g)S0 (I − g, g)
ª
(35)
The f.o.c. writes
H 0(g)
H(g)
S0 (I − g, g) = f
0(I − g)
r + λG (εd (I − g, g)) (36)
The left-hand side is still the marginal return to general skills, while the right-hand side
is the marginal return to specific skills. An increase in firing costs distorts investments
towards specific skills. On the one hand, initial match surplus S0 goes down, which
deteriorates the returns to general skills. On the other hand, εd decreases and jobs last
longer, which raises the returns to specific skills.
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To close the model, consider tightness determination
c
θ
µ (θ)
= (1− β)H (g)S0 (θ, I − g, g) (37)
where the dependence vis-à-vis θ has been highlighted. An increase in firing costs lowers
tightness as it depreciates initial match surplus S0. This alters the way students allocate
their investment between general and specific skills in the following way. First, it moder-
ates the direct negative impact of firing costs on initial match surplus. However, this is
only a second-order eﬀect and the marginal return to general skills decreases. Second, it
further raises the marginal returns to specific skills by increasing expected job duration.
To conclude, accounting for endogenous tightness does not alter our general result: firing
costs lowers the returns to general skills and raise the returns to specific skills at the time
of educational investment. This conclusion strengthens Wasmer’s point who examines on-
the-job investments, despite the fact that falling tightness further increases the returns
to specific skills in his framework, while it increases the returns to general skills in our
analysis. Put otherwise, general equilibrium eﬀects are not suﬃciently strong to oﬀset
the partial equilibrium impacts of firing costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of labor market frictions and institutions on the divide
of schooling investment between general and specific skills. We oﬀer a simple matching
model of unemployment in which individuals determine the scope and intensity of their
skills. In partial equilibrium, we show that the severity of market frictions distorts the
schooling allocation towards more general skills. Then, we endogenize job creation and
argue that changes in labor market institutions may well originate a non-monotonous
relationship between unemployment and the divide of skills between specific and general
human capital. Finally, we consider more carefully the impacts of three labor market
institutions which role on skill acquisition has been particularly emphasized by the previ-
ous literature: unemployment compensation, minimum wage and firing costs. We mainly
argue that unemployment compensation has an ambiguous impact on the skill divide,
while minimum wage and firing costs are detrimental to general skill acquisition.
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APPENDIX: The measure of the skill divide in schooling achievement with aggregate
data
In this Appendix, we discuss the aggregate evidence on the skill divide of educational
attainment in OECD countries. We show two results. First, there is substantial hetero-
geneity between countries in the skill divide which seems to persist over time. Second,
it is diﬃcult to argue that there is a clear Anglo-Saxon model and a clear (continental)
European model.
The discussion makes use of ISCED data, which organize an horizontal diﬀerentiation
of educational attainments. These data rank educational attainments into six levels (1 to
6), that go from pre-primary schooling to research. Within upper-secondary and tertiary
schooling, there are three diﬀerent types of education: from A (general) to C (vocational).
We aim at thinking about type B and type C as vocational schooling, while A is general
education. We compute the proportion of workers who choose a vocational education
rather than a general education at each level. Such computation involves some method-
ological choice. Namely, we must think about two issues. First, some of the cells do not
contain any numbers, because the relevant authorities did not provide with any number.
This means that corresponding individuals have been assigned to other cells, either ex-
plicitly (authorities told in which cells they have been put) or implicitly (authorities did
not tell anything about it). We have chosen to assign the value zero to such cells. Second,
there is a particular column that deserves some attention: post-secondary non-tertiary
schooling. These people have more than a secondary education, but this education has
not been given by a tertiary establishment (e.g. university, college, and so on). This
mostly corresponds to specific training for professional workers like nurses, teachers, and
so on. We have grouped these people with people with a tertiary education of type B.
It is important to recognize that these data have shortcomings, especially in light of our
debate. Our paper focuses on the individual trade-oﬀ between general and specific skills
at the time of educational investment. Namely, we want to understand how matching
frictions and labor market institutions alter the skill divide at the margin. However, the
aggregate data we use concern people who either completed a vocational education, or
a general education. We believe that these data allow us to proxy the phenomenon we
want to capture, but one must keep in mind that changes in the proportion of people who
choose a vocational education are not necessarily correlated with changes in the individual
proportion of educational investment that is invested in specific skill acquisition.
1. There is substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the skill divide which persists
over time
We only focus on graduates who have completed a tertiary education — we lack the
corresponding data for the upper-secondary educated. Table 1 gives the proportion of
tertiary educated by age group. Table 2 gives the proportion of tertiary educated who
have followed a general program.
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TABLE 1
TABLE 2
Tables 1 and 2 show substantial cross-section heterogeneity. They also display time
and space information, which allows us to examine how cross-section heterogeneity varies
over time. This information is displayed in Figures 3 and 4, which depict country-specific
patterns by age group. These figures show that between country heterogeneity does not
fall over time, and this seems true both for the proportion of tertiary educated and the
proportion of tertiary educated endowed with a general education. However, the propor-
tion of tertiary educated grows over time, which should be taken into account. In Figure
5, the proportion of tertiary educated of each age group is divided by the cross-country av-
erage of the same group. Figure 6 results from a similar computation. Figure 5 shows that
cross-section heterogeneity in educational attainment actually falls over time. This means
that there is convergence in the proportion of tertiary educated, even though there is still
considerable heterogeneity for the youngest generation (25-34). Figure 6 exhibits a very
diﬀerent pattern, because there is no convergence at all between the diﬀerent countries.
Such persistence in cross-section heterogeneity has a major implication. Country-specific
factors are more likely to alter the skill divide (horizontal component) rather than the
distribution of educational attainment (vertical component).
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 4
FIGURE 5
FIGURE 6
2. There are no clear European and Anglo-Saxon models
Table 3 gives the proportion of graduates in the 25-64 population who have followed
a general education. This proportion is disaggregated by schooling level, e.g. upper-
secondary schooling and tertiary level.
TABLE 3
This table fails to identify a European pattern and an Anglo-Saxon pattern. On the one
hand, focusing on upper-secondary schooling reveals spectacular diﬀerences. While France
and Germany have fairly low proportions of generally educated, things are drastically
diﬀerent in the US. Actually, there is no separate stream of vocational education at the
secondary level in the US. However, such diﬀerence does not generalize to other Anglo-
Saxon and European countries. On the other hand, the skill divide in secondary schooling
is not correlated at all with the skill divide in tertiary education. Figure 7 reveals that
fact.
FIGURE 7
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In the subset of Anglo-Saxon and European countries, this phenomenon is even more
striking as Table 4 shows: if European secondary educated tend to acquire more specific
skills than in the US, European tertiary educated tend to acquire more general skills than
in the US. Overall, the proportion of graduates with a general education irrespective of
educational level is about the same in the two groups of countries.
TABLE 4
3. Relationships with other papers
Krueger and Kumar (2004) and Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) also display some sta-
tistics to motivate their papers. They mostly emphasize enrollment rates in vocationnal
upper-secondary schooling. Without surprise, these figures highlight the German and US
cases as two extreme situations. Even though these statistics do not contradict what
we say in this Appendix, we believe that it is better to consider graduates rather than
enrollment rates. Graduates provide with a clear picture of the divide of educational
investment, because they have completed their education. By contrast, enrollment rates
may be misleading. Individuals who decide to follow a general secondary education may
then decide to follow a vocational tertiary education. From that perspective, the enroll-
ment rate in vocational upper-secondary education is an index of the schooling duration
rather than a proxy of the schooling divide. It is fair to recognize that Krueger and
Kumar (2004) as well as Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) know that fact. In their view, gen-
eral education is associated to longer studies. It is implicit in Krueger and Kumar, who
also consider cross-country diﬀerences in the entry rate into universities, "where general
education is primarily imparted" (their words). It is explicit in Mukoyama and Sahin
in which choosing a general education means paying more than choosing a vocational
education. Our paper clearly separates the level of education from the type of education,
which motivates the use of data on graduates.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
In this Appendix, we provide all the technical details required to follow sub-section
4.3.
Workers’ value functions are
rW (s, g, ε) = w(s, g, ε) (38)
+λ
∙Z ε0
εd(s,g)
W (s, g,eε)dG(eε) +G(εd(s, g))U(s)−W (s, g, ε)¸
rW 0 (s, g) = w0 (s, g) (39)
+λ
∙Z ε0
εd(s,g)
W (s, g,eε)dG(eε) +G(εd(s, g))U(s)−W 0(s, g, ε)¸
rU (s, g) = µH (g)
£
W 0 (s, g)− U (s, g)
¤
(40)
Firms’ value functions are
rJ (s, g, ε) = f (s) + ε− w (s, g, ε) (41)
+λ
∙Z ε0
εd(s,g)
J (s, g,eε) dG (eε)− (T − V )G ¡εd (s, g)¢− J (s, g, ε)¸
rJ0 (s, g) = f (s) + ε− w0 (s, g, ε) (42)
+λ
∙Z ε0
εd(s,g)
J (s, g,eε) dG (eε)− (T − V )G ¡εd (s, g)¢− J0 (s, g)¸
Match surplus are given in the text. We reproduce them here:
S0 (s, g) = W 0 (s, g)− U (s, g) + J0 (s, g)− V (43)
S (s, g, ε) = W (s, g, ε)− U (s, g) + J (s, g, ε)− V + T (44)
Nash bargaining implies that
W 0 (s, g) = βS0 (s, g) (45)
W (s, g, ε) = βS (s, g, ε) (46)
Finally, the productivity threshold derives from
S
¡
s, g, εd
¢
= 0 (47)
Mixing the diﬀerent conditions leads to the following equation for match surplus
(r + λ)S (s, g, ε) = f (s) + ε− r [U (s, g)− T ] + λ
r + λ
Z ε0
εd(s,g)
[1−G (eε)] deε (48)
Using (i) S0 (s, g) = S (s, g, ε0) − T , (ii) equations (40), (45) and (46), we finally obtain
the equations given in the text, that is
S0 (s, g) =
ε0 − εd(s, g)− (r + λ)T
r + λ
(49)
εd (s, g) = βµH (g)S0 (s, g)− f (s)− rT − λ
r + λ
Z ε0
εd(s,g)
[1−G(eε)] deε (50)
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The equation defining initial match surplus is very standard (see for instance the analogous
equation in Wasmer, 2006). The second equation is also standard, even though we have
written it a bit diﬀerently to get a more compact equation in our framework. The reader
can check that these equations can also be written in a less elegant way:
S0 (s, g) =
f (s) + ε0 − λT + λr+λ
R ε0
εd(s,g) [1−G(eε)] deε
r + λ+ βµH(g)
(51)
εd (s, g) [r + λ+ βµ(θ)H(g)] + λ
Z ε0
εd(s,g)
[1−G(eε)] deε = βµH(g)ε0 (52)
− (r + λ) {f(s) + T [r + βµ(θ)H(g)]}
Both initial match surplus and threshold productivity level go down with firing costs T .
The foc to the maximization program writes down:
H 0 (g)S0 (I − g, g) = H (g)
∙
∂S0 (I − g, g)
∂s
+
∂S0 (I − g, g)
∂g
¸
(53)
Using the facts that
∂S0 (s, g)
∂s
=
f 0 (s)
r + βµH (g) + λG (εd (s, g))
(54)
∂S0 (s, g) /∂g
S0 (s, g)
= −H
0 (g)
H (g)
βµH (g)
r + βµH (g) + λG (εd (s, g))
(55)
We finally get the equation given in text:
H 0(g)
H(g)
S0 (I − g, g) = f
0(I − g)
r + λG (εd (I − g, g)) (56)
To understand general equilibrium implications, let us highlight the dependence of the
diﬀerent variables in an explicit way. Hence, initial match surplus is S0 (θ, s, g, T ), while
the equilibrium is a duple (θ∗, g∗) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Initial match surplus and threshold productivity value
S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) = ε0 − ε
d(θ, I − g, g, T )− (r + λ)T
r + λ
(57)
εd (θ, I − g, g, T ) = βµ (θ)H (g)S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) (58)
−f (I − g)− rT − λ
r + λ
Z ε0
εd(θ,I−g,g,T )
[1−G(eε)] deε
(ii) Optimal divide of skills
H 0(g)
H(g)
S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) = f
0(I − g)
r + λG (εd (θ, I − g, g, T )) (59)
(iii) Equilibrium tightness
c
θ
µ (θ)
= (1− β)H (g)S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) (60)
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Equations (57) and (58) define initial match surplus and threshold productivity as
functions of tightness, general skills and firing costs. After simple computations, it comes
∂S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) /∂θ
S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) = −
α (θ)
θ
βµ (θ)H (g)
r + βµ (θ)H (g) + λG (εd (I − g, g)) < 0 (61)
∂εd (θ, I − g, g, T ) /∂θ
S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) = − (r + λ)
λG
¡
εd (I − g, g)
¢
r + βµ (θ)H (g) + λG (εd (I − g, g)) < 0 (62)
∂S0 (θ, I − g, g, T )
∂T
= −
λG
¡
εd (I − g, g)
¢
r + βµ (θ)H (g) + λG (εd (I − g, g)) < 0 (63)
∂εd (θ, I − g, g, T )
∂T
= − (r + λ) r + βµ (θ)H (g)
r + βµ (θ)H (g) + λG (εd (I − g, g)) < 0 (64)
Equations (59) and (60) jointly determine the equilibrium pair (g∗, θ∗). There exists a
unique equilibrium. Consider the following functions
φ1 (g, θ, T ) =
H 0(g)
H(g)
S0 (θ, I − g, g, T )− f
0(I − g)
r + λG (εd (θ, I − g, g, T )) (65)
φ2 (g, θ, T ) = c
θ
µ (θ)
− (1− β)H (g)S0 (θ, I − g, g, T ) (66)
Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of function Φ ≡ (φ1, φ2) evaluated in equilibrium.
J =
∙
∂φ1/∂g ∂φ1/∂θ
∂φ2/∂g ∂φ2/∂θ
¸
(67)
where partial derivatives are computed by use of equations (61) and (62). It can be shown
that7
∂φ1/∂g < 0 (68)
H 0
H
∂S0
∂θ
< ∂φ1/∂θ < 0 (69)
∂φ2/∂g ≡ 0 (70)
∂φ2/∂θ ≡ (1− β)
HS0
θ
(1− α) (r + λG) + βµH
r + βµH + λG
> 0 (71)
By the implicit function theorem,
∙
dg∗/dT
dθ∗/dT
¸
= −J−1
∙
∂φ1/∂T
∂φ2/∂T
¸
(72)
where
∂φ1/∂T <
H 0
H
∂S0
∂T
< 0 (73)
∂φ2/∂T ≡ − (1− β)H
∂S0
∂T
> 0 (74)
7The fact that ∂φ1/∂θ < 0 derives from uniqueness of equilibrium.
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and
J−1 =
1
detJ
∙
∂φ2/∂θ −∂φ1/∂θ
−∂φ2/∂g ∂φ1/∂g
¸
(75)
with detJ = (∂φ1/∂g) (∂φ2/∂θ) < 0. Therefore,
dθ∗
dT
sign
= (∂φ1/∂g) (∂φ2/∂T ) < 0 (76)
Hence, tigthness is strictly decreasing in firing costs as in the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Similarly,
dg∗
dT
sign
= (∂φ2/∂θ) (∂φ1/∂T )− (∂φ1/∂θ) (∂φ2/∂T )
< (1− β) H0H
∂S0
∂T
HS0
θ
(1−α)(r+λG)+βµH
r+βµH+λG + (1− β)
H0
H
∂S0
∂T H
∂S0
∂θ
= (1− β)H 0 ∂S0∂T S0
1−α
θ < 0
(77)
Thus, firing costs are detrimental to general skills, even though tightness is strictly de-
creasing in firing costs.
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Fig. 3: Proportion of tertiary educated by age group in 2003 (in %)
Fig. 4: Proportion of general among the tertiary educated by age group in 2003 (in %)
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Fig.5: Adjusted proportion of tertiary educated by age group in 2003
Fig.6: Adjusted proportion of general among tertiary educated by age group in 2003
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Fig.7: % general among secondary and tertiary educated, 2003
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Table 1: Proportion of tertiary educated by age group
55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 
Australia 24 31 32 36
Austria 11 14 16 15
Belgium 19 25 32 39
Canada 34 41 46 53
Denmark 25 32 34 35
Finland 24 31 38 40
France 14 18 23 38
Germany 22 25 26 22
Greece 10 16 23 24
Iceland 16 26 29 29
Ireland 14 21 27 37
Japan 19 33 45 51
Korea 10 16 33 47
Luxemburg 10 13 16 19
Netherlands 19 23 26 27
New-Zealand 27 32 31 33
Norway 22 28 33 39
Portugal 5 8 11 16
Spain 11 18 27 38
Sweden 26 32 34 41
Switzerland 22 25 29 30
UK 21 27 28 33
US 35 39 39 39
Source: Computations from Education at a glance (2006)
Table 2: Proportion of general between tertiary educated by age group
55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 
Australia 58 65 66 69
Austria 45 50 50 53
Belgium 42 44 44 46
Canada 53 49 48 53
Denmark 80 81 76 77
Finland 50 45 45 58
France 71 61 57 58
Germany 55 60 58 64
Greece 70 75 65 71
Iceland 75 73 76 79
Ireland 64 62 59 62
Japan 63 61 56 51
Korea 90 88 79 64
Luxemburg 40 46 44 37
Netherlands 89 91 88 93
New-Zealand 37 47 55 64
Norway 91 89 91 95
Portugal 60 75 82 81
Spain 82 78 70 68
Sweden 62 53 50 59
Switzerland 68 64 66 67
UK 67 67 68 73
US 77 77 74 77
Source: Computations from Education at a glance (2006)
Table 3: Proportion of general between secondary and tertiary educated in 2003
% secondary educated % tertiary educated Country type
Australia 65 65 AS
Austria 13 32
Belgium 75 43 CE
Canada 100 39 AS
Denmark 8 78
Finland 100 50
France 24 63 CE
Germany 4 47 CE
Greece 83 50 CE
Iceland 77 56
Ireland 100 42 AS
Italy 76 83 CE
Japan 100 55
Korea 100 73
Luxemburg 30 24
Netherlands 35 73
New-Zealand 47 43 AS
Norway 23 85
Poland 48 82
Portugal 100 82 CE
Spain 65 72 CE
Sweden 100 55
Switzerland 11 52
UK 27 68 AS
US 100 76 AS
Source: computations and Education at a glance (2006)
AS and CE stands for, resp., Anglo-saxon and Continental European.
Secondary stands for upper-secondary.
Table 4: Proportion of general within secondary and tertiary educated in 2003
Secondary educated Tertiary educated Overall
Anglo-saxon 0,73 0,55 0,61
European 0,61 0,63 0,61
Source: computations and Education at a glance (2006)
Secondary stands for upper-secondary.
Table A3: Numbers used to draw Figure 5
55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 
Australia 1,25 1,24 1,09 1,06
Austria 0,58 0,56 0,54 0,44
Belgium 0,99 1,00 1,09 1,15
Canada 1,78 1,64 1,56 1,56
Denmark 1,31 1,28 1,15 1,03
Finland 1,25 1,24 1,29 1,18
France 0,73 0,72 0,78 1,12
Germany 1,15 1,00 0,88 0,65
Greece 0,52 0,64 0,78 0,71
Iceland 0,84 1,04 0,98 0,85
Ireland 0,73 0,84 0,92 1,09
Japan 0,99 1,32 1,53 1,50
Korea 0,52 0,64 1,12 1,38
Luxemburg 0,52 0,52 0,54 0,56
Netherlands 0,99 0,92 0,88 0,80
New-Zealand 1,41 1,28 1,05 0,97
Norway 1,15 1,12 1,12 1,15
Portugal 0,26 0,32 0,37 0,47
Spain 0,58 0,72 0,92 1,12
Sweden 1,36 1,28 1,15 1,21
Switzerland 1,15 1,00 0,98 0,88
UK 1,10 1,08 0,95 0,97
US 1,83 1,56 1,32 1,15
Each cell is computed as follows.
First, we take country-specific proportion of tertiary educated for each age group.
Second, we divide it by the between-country average proportion for such group.
Table A4: Numbers used to draw Figure 6
55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 
Australia 0,90 0,99 1,03 1,05
Austria 0,70 0,77 0,78 0,81
Belgium 0,65 0,67 0,69 0,70
Canada 0,82 0,75 0,75 0,80
Denmark 1,23 1,25 1,20 1,17
Finland 0,77 0,69 0,70 0,87
France 1,10 0,94 0,89 0,88
Germany 0,84 0,92 0,91 0,96
Greece 1,08 1,15 1,02 1,07
Iceland 1,16 1,12 1,19 1,20
Ireland 0,99 0,95 0,93 0,94
Japan 0,97 0,93 0,87 0,77
Korea 1,39 1,34 1,24 0,97
Luxemburg 0,62 0,71 0,69 0,56
Netherlands 1,38 1,40 1,39 1,40
New-Zealand 0,57 0,72 0,86 0,96
Norway 1,40 1,37 1,43 1,44
Portugal 0,93 1,15 1,28 1,23
Spain 1,26 1,19 1,10 1,04
Sweden 0,95 0,81 0,78 0,89
Switzerland 1,05 0,98 1,03 1,01
UK 1,03 1,02 1,07 1,10
US 1,19 1,18 1,17 1,17
Each cell is computed as follows.
First, we take country-specific proportion of general
among tertiary educated for each age group.
Second, we divide it by the between-country average proportion for such group.
